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_Some_ Aspects of the Kenyan Beef Economy 
Over the past year'we have been engaged in studying 
various aspects of the Kenyan beef economy. Our results 
are recorded in a 300 page report which will be lodged with 
the Institute for Development Studies, the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and. Development and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. However, we felt that many of the issues 
which we investigated wetfe of sufficient interest to 
justify the production of a 'popular' but greatly condensed 
version of our findings in the hope that it will serve as a 
useful background for discussion purposes. 
For- those who may not be aware of the institutional and 
structural aspects of the beef market in Kenya, this is a 
good opportunity to briefly describe them. In practice there 
are three markets which overlap to a greater or lesser degree: 
the urban market comprising Nairobi, Mombasa, Thika and Nakuru 
which is dominated by the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC), the 
other urban and more populous rural areas in which an 
organised market may be said to exist, and the rural 
subsistance sector where it does not. We have tended to 
concentrate on the first of these markets because information 
on it is more readily available and KMC, as an agent of 
government policy on the beef industry, plays an important 
role in the development of the industry and justifies study. 
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I. The present and future beef situation in Kenya 
I»To The present situation (196?) 
L.I.I-. In the absence of a country wide census of the cattle 
population, a variety of methods were used to provide 
estimates of the present cattle population and offtake. 
Our final estimate is that in 1967 the cattle population of 
Kenya, including grade stock, was 7.331 m.head. The 
:: 'estimated offtake built up from district figures was 13.2% 
which represents 970,000 head which can be accounted for as 
follows: 
KMC consumption 
non-KMC consumption 
on-the-hoof exports 
The balance of 17,000 head constitutes the error element 
unavoidable in the estimates of this type. 
1.1.2. Our estimate of the average beef carcass weight including 
edible offal in 1967 is 280.8 lbs which would give a total 
domestic consumption of 23^ - m.lbs of beef, bone-in including 
edible offal, representing a consumption of 24.2 lbs per 
capita based on a 1967 human population estimate of 9.9^8 
million. 
1.1.3. There was more difficulty in estimating sheep and goat 
populations and offtake rates, but conservatively we 
estimate that the per capita consumption of sheep and goat 
meat was 3.6 lbs in 19&7» 
1.2. Methods used of estimating cattle populations and offtakes 
1.2.1. It may be of interest to briefly outline the methods which 
were used in building up estimates of the cattle population 
and rates of offtake. The basic data are estimates of district 
hide sales, rinderpest inoculations and cattle movements 
obtained from district annual reports of the Vet. Dept. and the 
Hides and Skins Inspection service. This method of using 
hide 'consumption' figures as a means of estimating cattle 
populations has been used before.in Kenya, notably by Spinks in 
1 
the East African Livestock Survey. Our estimates were based 
On the figures for 1965, 66 and 67. Spinks used 1963 figures 
alone and it is felt that since that time the standard of 
collection of hide sales figures in the:districts has improved. 
However, it must be admitted that for the districts of Wajir, 
Mandera and Garissa, hide sales figures were not available for 
1967 at the time of completing the report (in fact such 
figures from these districts are characteristically ve:.'y low) 
and.here Spinks' original and heroic estimates of cattle 
population for these districts were used. 
1. G.R. Spinks. Marketing of Livestock and Meat in Kenya 
(East African Livestock Survey.) FAO 1966. 
212,000 (net of Somali imports) 
720,000 
20,000 
953,000 
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I = 2o 2o The use of hide sales figures as estimates of beef ..consumption 
Obviously can lead to errors. The figures are based on returns 
of district cesses levied on hides when "they are moved out of a 
district.. Traders may simply avoid paying the cess by under-
recording their sales or they may hold on to stocks in a time of 
falling prices for. hides which is what occurred in 196?; bides 
may be used domestically and not.marketed; carcasses.may be 
•flayed but the meat not eaten.or, the other way round, the 
carcasses may not be flayed although the meat is eaten. Some 
of these errors, may be decreased by taking a series of years 
rather than one only. An allowance was, made for the domestic 
use of hides in certain.pastoral districts by adding 10?" to the 
known figures, of hide sales. This was the practice adopted by 
the Vet. Dept. in making earlier estimates of cattle populations. 
1.2.3. To the hide consumption figures for each district were added 
the net movements of cattle into the districts. Figures on 
these movements were obtained from returns of movement permits 
issued by the district vet,, officers. Therefore for most but 
not all districts, estimates of the total number of slaughter 
cattle consumed within the district boundaries andthe net offtake 
from the district (consumption plus or minus net cattle 
movements) were available. 
1.2.4. Clues on the size of the cattle population from which the 
offtake of each district was drawn were given by the offtake 
figures themselves (there is a floor set by the natural death 
rate, unlikely to be leas than 7»5%, a ceiling of not more 
than 25/0 under Kenyan conditions)' and rinderpest inoculations. 
Since the introductions of the CAG inoculant which removes the 
necessity of inoculating cattle twice, a series of inoculation 
figures for each district does give an indication ofthe number 
of immature cattle in the district and hence the cattle 
population. These figures provide clues of very variable 
reliability and they were not available for all districts, so 
for some districts comparisons had to be made between our 
offtake estimates and previously made estimates of the district 
cattle populations either by Spink's' or the Vet. Dept. The 
objective was to build up a picture of the existing cattle 
situation in Kenya piece by piece in the manner of a jigsaw 
puzzle. 
1.2.5. The estimates of the average carcass weights of cattle from 
different districts were derived from a'n analysis of the carcass 
weights of cattle purchased by KMC. 
1.3. The future situation .(1975) 
1.3.1. To make projections on supplies of slaughter cattle, 
assumptions.must be made 011 the feasible offtake, the cattle 
population and the-average carcass weight. Sophisticated 
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measurement of supply response is. out,of the question of course, 
but our opinion is that the overall cattle population will not 
increase"by ig75 but the offtake rate may be expected to 
increase from 13.2% in 196? to 15.5/' in 1975* We consider 
also that the average carcass weight may increase by 5% over 
the 1967 estimate. 
1.3.2. However, in forecasting these increases in offtake and 
average carcass weight, it is appreciated that, even these 
improvements will require a considerable degree of development 
in the beef cattle industry. This implies that the 
preconditions of commercial beef production will, have to be 
satisfied in some areas at present under subsistance pastoral 
farming. 
1.3.3. On the above assumptions, it is estimated that total supplies 
of beef will be about 32'c 111.lbs, bone-in including edible offal 
by 1975. 
1.3.4. Oh the demand side, an estimate of human population growth 
2. 
of 23»3A by 1975 ° over the 1967 level has been used. We 
assume conservative increases of 5/' for per capita rural 
incomes and 10% for Nairobi/Mombasa per capita incomes over 
the period 1967-1975° Also it was assumed that the elasticity 
of demand with respect to income is 1.0 in rural areas and 
1.3 in ITairobi/Mombasa. 
1.3.5. On this basis the projected supply of beef would nearly 
balance the projected domestic demand. If by 1975 is was 
found profitable to export beef, then a deficit would be 
created in the internal market which would generate increases 
in domestic prices. 
2. This is an early projection by the MEPD based ou the^ l^e 
census in Kenya. As such it is a little higher ' 
upper revised projection ma^e in 1967. 
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2. The KMC in the Kenyan beef market 
2•1• The domestic market 
2.1.1. In the domestic market KMC has an imperfect control over the 
urban beef markets of Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru. That is 
to say the slaughtering of cattle and the movement of beef 
into these markets from non-KMC sources is restricted to a 
licenced amount. KMC's control over the Eldoret market was 
relinquished in May 1968. 
2.1.2. KMC's domestic, sales amounted to about 30 million lbs CDW in 
1967; overseas sales were about 37 million lbs CDW of which 
over 29 million lbs were in canned corned beef. 
2.1.3- The arguments which may be put forward to maintain or 
strengthen KMC's monopolistic position in these urban markets 
are firstly that it ensures that regulations on meat hygiene 
and inspection are properly implemented in these markets and 
secondly that KMC as a large organisation, requires a large 
throughput in order to lower unit production costs. If this 
throughput were to be eroded by competitors in the domestic 
market who did not have to comply with the same stringent 
hygiene standards nor compete in overseas markets, unit 
production costs of KMC would increase, overseas markets may be 
lost, the health of a large proportion of Kenya's urban 
population would be jeopardised and the whole beef industry 
would suffer. 
2.1.4. . Despite these arguments, we recommend that KMC's monopolistic 
powers should be reduced and not increased by additional 
legislation designed to curb competition. The implementation 
of hygiene regulations on slaughtering premises and meat must 
be improved by a strengthened inspectorate service: in the 
case of slaughtering premises, controlled by the municipal 
public health authorities; and in the case of meat itself, 
controlled by the Vet. Dept. The objective, in the long run, 
should be the universal adoption of adequate hygiene standards 
plus the encouragement of private enterprise in an industry 
where African entrepreneurs may achieve a foothold fairly easily. 
Owners of existing premises for slaughtering stock should be 
encouraged to improve them and the applications for new 
licences to slaughter stock and market meat should be consider-
ed more in terms of the existing processing capacity of the 
local industry as a whole rather than whether or not KMC can 
tolerate additional competition. 
2.1.5. There is no doubt that KMC, up to the end of 1967 at least, 
was technically very inefficient. Using three different 
methods of assessing its technical efficiency, its co^ts of 
.,,. production were-.found to be excessive. For example in 1967 the 
operating costs' of KMC (excluding the canning- process) carae to 
Shs. 26.95 per 100 lbs CDW and the overhead costs Shs. 13.40 
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per 100 lbs CDW. As a comparison the slaughtering fees 
charged by the county councils in the slaughter houses in non-
KMC areas end by some private owners of licenced slaughter 
houses in urban areas controlled by KMC, are of the order of 
3hs. 12.50 to Shs. 15.00 per head of cattle. This is anything 
up to an' eighth of the costs incurred by KMC to perform 
essentially the same services, albeit at probably a lower 
standard. Therefore KMC must reduce its costs of production. 
It is believed that action has been taken already towards this 
end. 
2.1.6. The charge which KMC levies on retailers buying meat through 
its Nairobi wholesale depot, at 80 cents per 100 lbs CDW 
purchased does not seem' to be excessive. However, it covers 
only a part of the service normally provided by meat wholesalers: 
the actua 1 handling of meat from the processing plant into the 
retailer's possession, involving transportation from the plant 
to the depot, a certain amount of storage and administration. 
2.1.7. There is a separate charge made if retailers require KMC to 
transport meat from the wholesale depot to the retailer's 
premises. This amounts to Shs. 1.70 per 100 lbs CDW. While 
it is not known whether this is an economically justified rate 
or'not, it is recommended that the transport charge should varj 
with the actual distance involved and not be an average flat 
rate. 
2.1.8. There is the possibility that whatever improvements are made 
to the technical efficiency of KMC as a whole, its plants at 
Athi River and possibly Mombasa, are too large; they may be 
in fact incurring diseconomies of scale. If economies of 
scale were being achieved it would be expected that as output 
increased, the fixed element of production costs per unit of 
output would decline. This does not appear to be the case 
with KMC. Comparing 1966 with 1967, output increased from 
61.4 m.lbs to 69.3 m.lbs CDW of meat, yet.general works 
expenses increased from Shs. 20*24 to Shs. 22.48 per 100 lbs 
CDW and total overhead costs increased from Shs. 11.44 to 
Shs. 13.40 per 100 lbs CDW. What proportion of these increases 
are accounted for by rising prices of inputs is not known but 
these examples do raise some questions on what should be the 
economical optimum size of KMC as an administrative body and 
of its individual processing plants. 
2.1.9. Again there is no doubt that the plant at Athi River is 
obsolete and incurs high production costs while that at 
Mombasa is plagued by supply difficulties which also will tend 
to increase unit production costs. 
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2.1.10. As a quasi-governmental body the KMC' has to operate under 
difficult conditions because of constraints imposed upon it by 
the Government,, Possibly the worst restriction is the 
necessity of having to pass any changes'"in prices to producers 
or retailers through legislative channels before they may be 
enforced. Such a time consuming process prevents any rapid 
adjustments of prices being carried out' which are essential if 
a healthy trading position is to be maintained in a market so 
prone to fluctuations in prices of saleable products. A major 
factor contributing to KMC's unhappy trading record' in 1967 was 
the decline in world prices for animal by-products, particularly 
for hides and beef extract, in the face of which KMC could not 
respond in time by manipulating the prices it is in a position 
to control. 
2.1.11. Clearly if KMC is to operate on a more efficient basis, such 
restrictions must be removed. The Government may continue to 
advise KMC on its marketing policies but the decision to make 
price changes must rest with KMC and be the responsibility of its 
management. To this end it may be advisable to reduce the 
interests of producers on the managing board to prevent the 
repetition of former uncommercial pricing decisions. 
2.1.12. It is appreciated that the Government may wish to control 
decisions which would have a direct effect on the cost of living 
and the rate of development of the beef industry. Examples of 
these would be the prices that KMC charge retailers for different 
meats and the prices paid to producers for slaughter cattle. 
However, the Government itself will have to decide on how far 
KMC will be forced to implement Government policies and what 
importance should he attached to the- desirability of KMC at 
least avoiding a trading loss If these two objectives conflict. 
2.2. The overseas market 
2.2.1. While KMC enjoys a degree of monopoly in certain urban markets 
in PZenya, in. the overseas market 'in which It sells cut and 
carcass beef, canned corned beef and various by-products, KMC is 
very much a price taker. Possibly the most important factor here 
is that on present trends the rising domestic demand for beef is 
likely to have eroded the-present exportable 5 su.rplus' by the 
middle of the next decade. This will cause- KMC to compete more 
vigourously with domestic buyers in' order to achieve its present 
level of throughput and the resulting increases in'prices for 
slaughter stock may render the e port of beef in any form an 
uneconomic proposition. 
2.2.2. It seems that in 1967, contrary to popular opinion, the export 
of ca ".ned corned be-ef was not a profitable enterprise. Should 
the vjorld prices of by-products, including beef extract, remain 
depressed in the face of rising prices for slaughter oattle it 
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may have to rely 011 the domestic beef market alone, unless 
KMC is subsidised by the Government in order to earn foreign 
exchange. 
2.2.3 It has to be faced that it is very unlikely that within the 
next decade Kenya will be permitted to enter the lucrative cut 
and carcass beef market of Western Europe. The veterinary and 
health regulations which are rigourously•applied amount to trade 
restrictions diplomatically disguised. Kenya is hampered too 
from competing - effectively in the beef markets of the Mediterran-
ean, the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean countries by high 
transport costs. The clo.sure of the Suez Canal and the 
withdrawal of British troops from Aden havebeen recent and 
additional blows to the higher priced chilled or frozen beef 
market. The canned corned beef market is attractive because 
the selling arrangements are relatively simple, the bulk of 
Kenya's ouput being sold in the U.K. under the Fray Eentos 
label, and the prices received for a product of relatively low 
raw material cost appear to be high. Yet if the costs of the 
purchased inputs, notably the packing materials, the tins and 
cartons etc. are deducted from the selling price, the net value 
added by the process is extremely small indeed. In fact the 
profitability of the canning process is very dependent 011 the 
world prices of cattle hides and other by-products, particularly 
beef extract. In 19&7 when these prices were abnormally low, 
it seems likely that KMC incurred a trading loss on its canning 
activities. 
2.2.4 An alternative to the canned corned beef trade would be to 
produce a product in a processed form which would successfully 
circumnavigate the existing veterinary and health regulations 
applied 011 meat products imported into Western Europe, involving 
possibly less packaging expenses and utilising beef of a medium 
quality which Kenya can produce relatively cheaply but which 
European producers do not find attractive to market. Their 
generally high cost production methods have to be justified 
by selling in the high price carcass beef retail trade. The 
concept of a medium quality beef market is mentioned purposely 
because this would enable the producers at present marketing 
low quality cattle fit only for the can, to be encouraged by 
higher prices to produce cattle of improved quality. Under 
the present and past policy of diverting a large proportion of 
KMC's total output into the conned beef trade (nearly 50% in 
1967) it is not in the commercial interests of KMC to encourage 
the bulk of producers to improve their stock because to do so 
would mean that a higher price would have to be paid for a 
product- which, in the can, does not have a proportionally 
higher market value. We do not consider that it is in -tT-o 
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in.tere-sts of.Kenya's beef cattle industry that this state of 
affairs diould be perpetuated. 
2.2.5 Therefore we recommend that KMC should actively investigate 
the overseas market for other forms of..processed beef, 
particularly cooked beef which is used as an intermediate 
product for a wide-range of manufactured meat products in 
. Europe. There majr well, be a ni.che for Kenya here, an 
interstice in a market dominated by the large producers such 
as Argentina and Australia. 
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^^Projections on1 the demand for'-IgiC beef by 1975 
3.I.I.. An overall analysis of demand for beef even in urban areas of 
Kenya is impossible because of insufficient data. . However, 
enough information was available on IOC sales in Nairobi in the 
period 1955 to 1966 to perform a quantitive analysis of demand 
for KMC beef in the Nairobi area. 
3.1.2. Changes in KMC's selling policy in May 1967 (selling quarters 
instead of complete sides to retailers) and a. strengthening of 
the legislation designed to increase KMC's monopoly power in 
the Nairobi market cause a discontinuity in the sales series in 
1967. However it is considered that the price and income 
elasticities derived from the analysis will still be valid for 
demand projections. The best estimates of these two parameters 
are 
Elasticity of demand with respect to price -0.8 
Elasticity of demand with respect to income 1.6 
3.1.3° Although these parameters sir gest that KMC faces a slightly 
inelastic demand for its products, KMC would not benefit by 
raising its prices to retailers. For if KMC do raise their 
prices by 10% it is estimated that retailers would raise their 
prices by 12% (implying a retail mark-up of 20%) and this would 
reduce the quantity purchased by 9-6%. Thus KMC's revenue would 
barely rise. 
3.1.4. With the data available it was not feasible to differentiate 
between the demands for beef of 'high' and 'low' quality mainly 
because consumers distinguish more between fore and hind quarter 
beef than between grades of beef. Therefore these estimates 
of elasticities of demand refer to total beef. 
3.1.5. As the measure of price elasticity is approaching unity, the 
measure of price flexibility which for the purposes here may be-
taken to be the reciprocal of price elasticity, will be only a 
little more than unity. Therefore if KMC did not administer 
prices to retailers and if supplies of KMC beef were to increase 
by 10%, the resulting decrease in price to clear the market 
would be about 11 to 12'... 
3.1.0 Looking now at the effect of increases in per capita incomes on 
the de- and for KMC beef, if disposable incomes per adult 
equivalent (2 children of 15 years or under equal 1 adult 
equivalent) increase by 10%, then the demand for KMC beef is 
likely to increase by about l£ . This is high but not 
unexpectedly so in an area (Nairobi) where incomes are still 
relatively low by the standards of a developed economy yet where 
fresh beef is readily and daily available. A contributory factor 
is that KMC beef may be regarded by many consumers as being a 
luxury article which they would be more likely to buy as their 
incomes increased. This would tend to increase the income 
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elasticity of demand for KMC beef above the level normally 
associated with total beef. 
• 3-1°7* Ignoring price changes-for.the time being, if per capita 
disposable incomes on an adult equivalent basis in the OIC urban 
arease are assumed to-have increased by 10% by .1973 (over the 19t,r:' 
level) we estimate that the demand for KMC beef in these markets 
will be about 53 m. lbs'CDW.. If an allowance is made for export's 
of say 30 m. lbs which was the 1966/6? level, the total demand 
is 83 m. lbs CDW, although as h&s been pointed out above, rising' 
prices for slaughter stock may make the export beef without 
subsidisation an unprofitable exercise. With an average carcasa 
weight of 326 lbs CDW, an increase of 5% over the 1967 estimated 
figure, this represents 255,000 head of cattle compared to some 
213,000 head 'consumed' by KMC in 1967. 
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4. Projections on the supply of slaughter oattie to KMC by 1975 
A . L L The .basis for these projections was an analysis of KMC 
supplies of slaughter, cattle over the period of 1953 to 1967. 
As considerable developments have- taken place in the industry 
during, this time, an econometric model was used incorporating 
a lagged response to price changes, the lag being distributed 
according to a method proposed by Koyck^° The resulting equation 
yields both long and short run elasticities of response to price 
changes. In 1967 the best estimates of point elasticities were 
1-7 &nd 1.0 respectively. Obviously prodiicers are more 
responsive to price changes in the long run when they can vary 
their productions plans than in the short run. In this case 
the short run means a period which was estimated to be 3 years. 
4.1.2. As with the preceeding analj<"sis of demand, difficulties are 
encountered when the regression equation is used as a direct 
basis for projections to 1975° This is because the data from 
which the equation is calculated cover a period when a surplus 
of beef may be said to have existed. That is to say there was 
no shortage of slaughter cattle likely to cause an upward 
movement in prices. This situation may not remain to 1975 
although as stated above, the potential deficit by that year will 
not be large if anticipated developments occur in the beef 
producing industry. Therefore any price increases in slaughter 
cattle are likely to be caused more by production cost increases 
than by the demand greatly exceeding the supply. 
4.1.3. Apart from one year (1959), since the inception of KMC in 1951 
producer prices have steadily increased up to January 1968 when 
they were reduced, except for 4th grade. If it is accepted 
that there is a 3 year lag in producers' response to a price 
change, certainly the 1968 average producer prices are high 
enough to bring forward the required number of cattle by KMC up 
to the early 1970's. Subsequently and up to 1975, prices may 
have to be increased mainly to overcome the effect of increasing 
production costs which are inevitable and which failing a 
technological breakthrough in production methods, will not be 
counteracted by increasing productivity in the industry. Also 
by this time the projected increase in domestic demand for beef 
in Kenya as a whole should be pressing on supplies, a hitherto 
unknown event. 
4.1.4. It may be considered that further reductions in producer prices 
should 1e made in view of KMC's trading deficit in 1967° However 
we recommend that such direct cuts should be made only after a 
very thorough,appraisal of the situation. With such a lagged 
response to price changes, once the cattle supply curve facing 
KMC begins to unwind downwards, it may prove to be a lengthy and. 
costly business trying to ij^crease supplies to KMC in the fuuure. 
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In a following section we recommend changes in the grading 
and pricing policies of KMC whic!" will result in further slight 
yet indirect reductions to average producer returns. Rather 
than jeopardise the desirable developments of the industry which 
psychologically direct, reductions in producer returns may entail, 
we recommend that indirect means of achieving economies should 
be used. 
L. M. Koyck.• Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis. 
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5. The Retailing of Beef in KMC areas 
"5.I.I. The KMC has a theoretical wholesale monopoly in the towns of 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kakuru and (until recently) Eldoret. Sales 
of beef to retailors in 19&7 through the wholesale depot in 
the case of Nairobi and. from the KMC controlled nlaughter-hou ec 
in"the case of the other towns were as follows: 
Table 1. KMC Wholesales 1967 
CDW !000 lbs 
BEEF OTHER MEAT ALL NEAT 
NAIROBI 19,663 1,555 21,218 
. MOMBASA 7,053 302 7,355 
MANURI! 2,4? 4 194 2,619 
ELDORET 1,115 32 1,147 
5.1.2. It is of interest to note from the table above that KMC sales 
of Mutton, Lamb and Goat meat taken together were only 7% in 
quantity terms of total KMC carcass meat distribution at 
wholesale levels in Nairobi and Makuru and had an even smaller 
share in the other centres. 
5.1.3- In analysing the retail market against this background it 
became necessary because of the limited time available to concen-
trate upon the Nairobi market although retail meat price data 
was also collected for akuru axd Eldoret. 
5.2. The aims of the retail survey 
5.2.1. A major aim of the survey was to analyse the geographical and 
socio-economic types of market structure to indentify the 
purchasing patterns of butchers and calculate retail margins for 
• beef. 
5.3. Methodology 
5.3.1. The KMC wholesale invoices of the 192 retailers were analysed 
by taking a sample of 6 weeks from the whole of the 1967 calendar 
year. As it was essential to choose time periods which 
represented both the peaks and the troughs in the monthly purchase-
pattern the sample'was made more deliberately purposive by the 
device of grouping the 6 weeks into 3 two-week periods. The 
intervals between the weeks;chosen was decided upon to represent 
a reasonable spread' through the year."1'0 Thus the 3 two-week 
periods analysed were in May/June, September and November. 
The weekly average quantity of beef of all grades purchased was 
found, to be 367,302 lbs for the sample and 378,135 lbs for the 
whole year. 
When first drawn the sample consisted of 4 two-week periods the 
first of whic1- was February 20th - March 4th„ This period 
was discarded for the purposes of analysis as it represented 
the situation before the change from selling mainly beef sides 
to selling in' quarters and the consequent price adjustment 
w- ich took effect' from l.^ 'th May., 1967. 
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5.3.2. For the purposes of the first, stage of .the analysis details of 
wholesale purchases during .the sample periods were extracted and 
plac.ed into distinct geographical and type of market groupings. 
Butchers purchasing more than 15% of their total KMC carcass 
.beef.supplies from Baby Beef/First, GAQ and FAQ hindquarters 
were considered, to belong to the higher income grouping 
regardless of location. 
5.3.3. After grouping the 192 butchers and analysing the purchase 
records on a group basis the next stage was to attempt as 
comprehensive a coverage as possible of the main groups to 
collect retail price information and other data on the retail 
structure. Out of the 192 butchers for which meat purchase 
records had been completed 39 (including 20 which in a 
geographical sense were unplaced) were not considered for 
enumeration leaving 153 from which to attempt the best possible 
coverage. The 6l% cover (93 out of 153) which was achieved was 
considered satisfactory bearing in mind that many of the lower 
grade butchers were found to be somewhat irregular purveyors 
ofmeat and that as such their premises were found to be closed 
when initital and sometimes subsequent visits were made to a 
particular area. 
Gross retail margins were calculated for all locational and type 
of market groups using the mean values for each group as the 
required wholesale cost and retail pripe data. The basis of 
the Gross Margin analysis was to relat$ the 'cost' of 100 lbs 
of carcass beef to the return derived from the same quantity of 
beef via retail sales. The cost per 100 lbs of beef was 
calculated on the basis of the ruling wholesale prices for 
different grades (fore and hind) of beef and the proportions of 
the different grades purchased - hence the practice of using a 
100 lb unit so that the proportions purchased expressed in 
percentage terms multiplied by the ruling grade prices would 
produce an 'input cost' per 100 lbs. 
5.3.5. The, calculation of the gross return was based upon average 
2. 
yield 'data for different grades of beef from which it was 
possible to draw up 'return schedules' based upon the grade mix 
of-the average 100 lbs of meat purcha.sed. 
5.4. The results1 of the Analysis 
5.4.1. The structure of the retail trade and market requirements. 
Some of the more relevant findings of the study of the KMC 
supplied Mairobi retail meat market are presented in the table 
- below. : ~ 
2., The use of yield data derived for different grades of meat 
makes it possible to.make allowance for the variation in rross 
returns for different grade mixes"due to the differing 
proportions of bone, fat, waste and saleable cute- of meat which 
are yielded. 
Table 2. Purchase Pattern Analysis 
PURCHASE PATTERN 
CDW lbs purchased expressed as a percentage* 
GAO , FAQ 3rd 4th 
location or 
t yp e 0 f 
Market Group 
High Class 
Nairobi and 
Suburbs 
t F F l H F B F H' . F 1 Mutton 
j + Lamb 
i 
32.9 3.2 j 
! 
14.6 1.7 7.8 2.9 11.7 6.5 | 15-5 » 
I 
Mun i c ipal 
Market 
1 
16.1 3-5 13.£. 1.8. 8.5 6.2 25.6. 13.8 8.8 
Eastlands 49.5 0.2 24.4 10.7 '8.7 2.7 1.6 1.4 
Eastleigh/ 
Pangani 16.3 I 0.3 11-5 i 17.8 13-1 28.8 5.9 2.8 
Pumwani/ 
Shauri Moyo 39-2 : - 29.9 7.9 H . 6 4.2 5.3 0.3 
River Road/ 
Kariokor 0.6 21.7 ; 1.2 15-7 6.6 14.1 11.8 13.6 5-1 
Nibera/ 
Dagoretti 
Corner 
3.3 
1 
i - 46.5 
i 
3-6 33.3 
9.5 1"2.9 
10.0 - -
All Purchasers j 9.1 17.4 5 5.2 12 . 6 15-9 7.7 6.9 
* Note that the rows do not - for any of the groups - add up to 
100%. The difference is made up of small amounts of Baby Feef 
and 1st Grade, Goat Meat, Beef Flanks and Veal. 
5-4.2. Table 2 shows the main feature of the Nairobi Market; 
its dualistic structure. There are in effect two markets -
a high income market requiring cuts of meat mainly from good 
quality hindquarters and a low/middle income market which 
simply requires 'beef', preferably with a fair proportion of 
fat. The requirements of the latter given the current price 
structure, are most adequately met by the retailing of meat 
taken from the forequarter of the animal - hence the distinct 
purchase pattern shown in Table 2. 
5.4.3. It is apparent that there is likely to be a consistent 
imbalance between fore and hind quarter beef requirements for 
local consumption. This is illustrated at Table 3 which is 
based solely 011 purchs.se records, and thus covers all 192 
butchers for which purchase records'were collected. 
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Table 3. Total Weekly Purchases (lbs CDW) 
Nairobi Butchers - Average of a 6-week sample 
GAQH F IMBALANCE FAQ I F FAQ IMBALANCE 
High Class Nairobi 
and Siiburbs 
! 
• 20264 
< 
: 1 9 6 3 +18-301 • 9350 1027 + 8323 
Municipal Market . -12540 4 0 9 0 + 8450 10186 _ 1620 + °566 
All other groups 952 J 51094 -50142 2075 32761 -30686 
Total 33756 ;57147 -23391 21611 35408 -13797 
No. of -Butchers 
buying : : ; 41. -j 148 -
_ ? ? „ 155 
-[ 
,5.4.4. The resulting surplus of GAQ and 3fAQ hindquarters must be 
sold on the export market in the form of frozen quarters or 
primal cuts. During the last three months of 1967 and the 
first six months of 1968 there has been sufficient indication 
that with the limited • export markets facing the KliC a persistent 
Surplus of GAQ and (to a less extent) FAQ hindquarters was being 
built up. . Reference., .is made, elsewhere in this paper to the 
.). . . . 
problems created by this imbalance and to the need for a more 
flexible pricing, policy to accommodate it. 
5.4.5. : Connected with this is the observed absence of any developed 
middle-income market. A limited number of. the municipal market 
stalls and retailers in the River Road and Eastleigh groups 
would appear from the price data collected to be selling cuts 
of mes.t, particularly 'steak* at 40 or 50 cents below the price of 
rump steak in the High Class Nairobi and suburbs group, based 
upon a predominant purchase of 3rd grade hindquarters. On the 
whole however, it Would appear that the middle income earner bujTs 
'meat' rather than cuts of meat and as such is eating mainly 
forequarters beef. Ifthe KMC develop their earlier ideas on 
establishing a retail shop with demonstration prices, we would 
recommend that they could most usefully play a part in this as 
yet Unexploited sector of the market as a means of encouraging 
a few of the more progressive 'meat shops' to provide hindquarter 
cuts of beef for their customers. . . . 
5 . 5 , • Retail Margins 
5>5-l» Table 4 shows the gross revenues, costs and margins for all 
seven groups. Alt!: ough the calculation of gross revenue has 
been explained in the methodology section above, it is important 
to re-emphasise that considerable care was taken in arriving at 
acceptable yield measures to apply to different grades of meat. 
This involved canvassing opinion rather than scientific testing 
although referance was made to the appropriate literature. 
The KMC do not appear to have any consistent yield data based on 
actual carcass cu.tting, although some results were available 
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from high grade hindquarters as part of a test in connection 
with the preparation of cut beef. 
We would strongly recommend that ah' organisation such as the 
KMC should have t'-is sort of yield information. We reconnend 
that they should take immediate steps to obtain it - preferably 
in conjunction with selected butchers so that the realism of 
market requirements is maintained. Eindand forequarter yields 
from all grades should be calculated and the test sample should 
cover the full extent of the possible .CDW range for each grade. 
Table Gross Retail Margins per 100 lbs of Beef 
Revenue Cost 
] Margin as a percentage 
of Revenue 
No. of 
Butchers 
shs. cts. shs. cts. 
High Class Fairobi 
and suburbs 186 39 151 62..-. 18.7 16 
Municipal Market 163 25 135 07 17-3 10 
Eastlands 153 97 112 05 27-2 19 
Eastleigh/Pangani 142 85 118 79 16.8 10 
Pumwani/Shauri Moyo 141 40 | 116 
16 j112 
0 -7 <- 3 17.4 19 
Piver Road/Kariokor 141 01 20.7 10 
Zibera/Dagoretti 
Corner 
128 05 i 109 11 14.8 q 
1 
5.5-3- In terms of the average gross retail margins we do not 
consider the 1°.7% for the High Class Nairobi and Suburbs T 
or 17.3)j for the Municipal Market to be excessive.^" 
Although they have a much higher turnover than for example, 
the Eastleigh/Pangani or Pu. wani/Shauri-Moyo groups they 
provide a completely different product to their customers. 
Any comparison between the two markets, is for this reason 
misleading. 
5 ° 5 - S o m e of the most interesting results are those obtained 
from the lower and middle income market groups. It is of 
particular interest to note the relatively large margin range 
between the low price groups. Thus Eastlands has by far the 
largest margin which as an expression of the respective gross 
revenues is almost 10%- higher than the Fumwani/Shauri Moyo 
group.- This is an order of difference which was not 
expected. It can be seen that although the Eastlands group 
3-. The '•'Verdon-Smith" report (albeit by a somewhat different 
approach) found a Gross Margin for the surveyed independent 
butchers of 22.2% in 1962 in the United Kingdom. 
p.p. 103 to 107 ''Report of the Committe of Enquiry into 
Fatstock and Carcass Meat Marketing and Distribution1''. 
Cmncl 2282 February 1964. 
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lias both a higher revenue and lower cost figure than Pumwani/ 
Shauri Moyo- the difference in margin is determined primarily by 
the difference in gross revenues. Thus according to the 
analysis the consumer in 'Eastlands is, in comparison with the 
consumer in Pumwani/Shauri Movo, paying more for beef of 
(on the average) a slightly inferior quality. 
5. 5•"5. I?1- contrast Kibera/Dagoretti • Corner butchers have the smallest 
margin of all groups but they also pay less for their beef at 
wholesale thain do other groups. Reference to the purchase 
pattern shows that FAQ and 3rd Grade forequarters rather than 
GAQ forequarters are purchased and in fact only one member of 
the group purchased any GAQ fores at all. In further contrast, 
in Eastleigh/Pangani all members purchased GAQ fores with a 
group average of 16.3% as opposed to 11.5% and 13.1% for FAQ 
and 3rd Grade fores respectively. 
5.5-6. We do not consider that any of the findings of the retail 
margin investigation merit intervention into the retail market 
by KMC. The limit of participation should be the establishment 
of a retail shop in each of the Eastlands and Eastleigh/Pangani 
residential areas. For accounting purposes such a demonstration 
shop should be treated by the KMC as a completely separate 
and autonomous unit; the meat should be purchased from the KMC 
wholesale depot and all expenses should be met from gross profits. 
By means of the demonstration shop butchers may be encouraged 
to produce basic cuts of meat particularly steaks. We would, 
however, consider that cooking facilites in most low and middle 
income homes prohibit anything more than a gradual expansion in 
consumption . of joints of meat. This being so we would not 
encourage the KMC to go into the cut meat business for local 
consumption. Joints are not generally required in the low and 
middle income markets whilst the higher income retailers employ 
butchers and prefer to cut up the meat themselves. 
5.5.7. Based on the results of the retail margin analysis only the 
Eastlands group could be sa.id to- have an excessive margin 
relative to the services provided. VJe. consider that the 
implementation of the recommendation made above on the 
establishment of a demonstration, shop would be the most 
appropriate action particularly from" the point of view of 
encouraging, the purchase of higher grade and also hindquarter 
"meat. -
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6. Government Policy and the KMC? a critique and reco^mendations 
6.1. Grading of slaughter cattle 
6.1.1. As shown on the section on the retail .market for beef, the 
absence of a large middle income group of consumer's In urban 
areas means that there is virtually no demand for medium 
quality beef. The present grading system is not used at all 
in the lower income market, retailers buying on a lowest price-
basis. In the overseas market, the canned corned beef trade 
do® not differentiate between grades of beef provided that a 
certain proportion of fat is maintained, and while the cut/ 
carcass beef trade requires a carcass of good quality, it tdoes 
not distinguish between say GAQ and FAQ grades. Therefore the 
wide range of quality standards provided by the present grading 
system is not justified by the requirements of the beef market: 
all that is needed is a simple division into 'upper' and 'lower' 
grades. 
6.1.2. We feel that the relatively small market for superior quality 
beef, (Baby Beef and 1st Grades) could be made more- flexible by 
dropping these two grades and all owing ps'Cci ilers and caterers 
who wish to buy such quality beef to trade directly with the 
producers of it. KMC should continue to slaughter, inspect and, 
if necessary, store the product at agreed charges. Also 
retailers should be permitted to set their own prices for this 
quality beef market. 
6.1.3. We are convinced that the remaining four grades should be 
reduced to effectively two or possibly three grades, and the 
grading system shouldbe placed on a more objective basis than 
the existing one. , Cattle are graded in theory according 
to the degree of finish of the dressed carcass. However, whenwe 
analysed the weight distribution of some 50»OOO sides of beef 
graded at KMC's Athi Piver factory, we found that in fact cattle 
virtually were graded on weight with a clear•division at a side r 
of 200 lbs CDW. Only 5.4% of GAQ animals and 23-3% of FAQ :. 
animals weighed.less than 400 lbs CDW, and only 20.6% of 3rd 
grade and 2.4% of 4th grade, weighed morethan 400 lbs CDW. We 
propose,therefore that cattle should be graded mainly on a 
weight basis, but with two reservations. First, we recommend 
that a higher price per lb. should be pa id for animals of over 
400 lbs. CDW which are less than 4^ years old, tMs being the 
beef, demanded by the higher income market. Second, all beef 
currently downgraded for excessive bruising or on public health 
grounds should continue to be penalised. The remaining cattle 
wo-Id be paid for on a per lb basis, a higher price being paid 
for those over 400 lbs CDW. This should encourage producers 
to market their cattle only when they have attained a reasonable 
size. 
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6.1.4. To prevent abuse of the system and the production of 
overfat cattle, we propose that penalties should be imposed 
on carcasses weighing more than 600 lbs C.DW.. . This would 
represent an animal of approximately 1200 lbs liveweight. 
6.1.5. Apart from the advantages of rationality and objectivity, 
the proposed simplified grading system should reduce KMC's 
administrative costs.. The effect on producers' returns of this 
proposed system, need be marginal only: a narrowing of the 
range of quality differentials which would tend to reduce the 
returns accruing to producers of .the higher..grade cattle, but 
increase them to producers of lower, grade cattle. 
6.1.6. A summary of the proposed grading system is 
Standard Grade - Carcasses of less than 400. lbs CDW. 
Select Grade - Carcasses of. more than 400 lbs but less 
than 600 lbs CDW.. 
(Select overweight) All carcasses of more than 600 lbs CDW. 
Choice Grade - As for Select Grade but carcasses from 
cattle of less than 4-J years of age. 
6.2. KMC's pricing policies 
6.2.1. In a preceding section the standard of KKC's technical 
efficiency was criticised. Here the economic efficiency of 
the pricing policies adopted by KMC is appraised: whether it 
results in the efficient allocation of resources in the beef 
industry and whether it facilitates or hinders the development 
of that part of the industry which it influences. 
6.2.2. The existing policy on prices charged to retailers and paid 
to producers is very inflexible. Generally but not invariably 
prices are fixed at the beginning of each year and this makes 
it difficult for KMC to follow its proclaimed break-even 
accounting policy. For KMC is faced by fluctuating prices 
for its final products in overseas markets and, especially 
important, for its by-products upon which its profitability 
largely depends. Up to 1963 KMC was allowed a certain 
accounting margin by paying producers in two stages: an 
initial payment on the delivery of cattle followed by a bonus 
when the annual trading profit had been calculated. This 
policy was abandoned and now KMC is placed "in a difficult 
trading position as it no longer can adjust its producer prices 
to accommodate changes in the relationships between the 
supplies of cattle and. the demands for KMC products. 
6.2.3. In attempting to prescribe a realistic pricing policy for 
KMC designed to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, 
we are faced with three important constraints. First, we 
realise that the Government will wish to retain its policy of 
fixing wholesale prices for the- low income beef market. 
Second, we feel that with KMC'- existing standards of accounting 
methods, any sophisticated pricing policy based on equating 
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marginal costs and price is impracticable. Nevertheless KMC 
should realise that if it has a. conventionally shaped marginal 
cost curve, it cannot expand its production of canned corned 
beef Indefinitely without incurring losses. Thirdly, KMC is 
• not a profit making body but has as its prime objective the 
supply of the domestic market with beef at the lowest price 
commensurate with maintaining long term supplies of beef. 
6.2.4. Therefore we recommend that prices to producers and for 
domestic consumers of KMC beef should be based on an opportunity 
cost principle andreflect the net value of the different forms 
and grades of beef realised by the various markets. The net 
value implies that marketing costs including purchased inputs, 
plus processing costs, have been deducted from the gross sales 
value to which would be added the appropriate net value of the 
by-products. The pricing system could be built up from the 
net value realised for beef in the lowest prices and most price 
elastic market - canned corned beef. For example, the 
producer price for Standard grade cattle would be based on the 
canned corned beef market: the net value of the product plus 
the value of by-products including beef extract, less processing 
and administration expenses. The wholesale price on the domes-
tic market for beef of this quality wouldbe geared to the 
producer price plus processing and marketing costs, less the 
value of by-products. Thus it would be linked indirectly to 
the canned corned beef market. 
6.2.5» We recommend that such calculations leading to the reassessment 
of producer and consumer prices should be made as frequently 
as possible, due attention being, paid to the likely supplies 
of cattle and the expected prices for canned corned beef and 
by-products on the world market. 
6.2.6. It is apparent that in the domestic market, demand patterns 
are being distorted by the price subsidisation of the market 
as a whole, although the lower grades are subsidised to a 
greater extent than the higher grades. In fact we sur-gest 
that a major factor contributing to KMC's trading loss in 
1967 was the decline in the prices received by KMC for its 
products (including by-products of course) in the world 
market which meant that this element of subsidy which we 
calculated to have been about £K 200,000 in 196?, was fully 
exposed. 
6.2.7. The table below compares the calculated break-even wholesale 
price for four existing grades in the domestic market with the 
actual 1968 wholesale prices. These break-even prices are-
based on fairly crude assumptions and on 196? cost data but 
they indicate the amount of subsidisation involved. 
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Table 1. :Break-even prices and subsidisation 
k\ade 5,' hinds/fores 1968 combined ' Break-even 'subsidy' 
side price price cts per lb (shs. per 100 lbs) 
GA? 55A5 158.00 about I58.OO nil 
fko 1 54/46 142.40 about 147.40 about 5 
3rd ' : 53/47 ' 121.2-0 -. about' 138.40.. .. about 17 
4th 52/48 • 105.60 about 122.40 about 16-17 
The explanation for this is relatively simple. If it is 
assumed - and it appears to be reasonable to do so - that the 
costs of transportation, slaughtering, processing and marketing 
beef on a per lb CDW basis are the same for all grades, and the 
value of the by-products, also on a per lb CDW basis, similarly 
is equal for all grades, then the price differentials between 
grades at the producer level shoi;ld. be maintained down to the 
wholesale level. Under the present pricing policy these 
differentials widen, the upper grades attain:aewholesale prices 
which just about break even on these cost assumptions but the 
lower grades fail to do so. 
6.2.8. The differentials between the fore and hindquarter prices at 
the wholesale level similarly should reflect the current supply 
and demand relationship. . Claarly if there is a deficit of 
forequ.arters but a su.rplus of hindquarters of a particular grade 
of beef, the relative prices shotild be adjusted accordingly. 
The existing policy of having rigid and arbitrary quarterprice 
differentials is unrealistic. In the low price beef market, 
quarter price differentials are not nec essary. 
6.2.9. Seasonal fluctuations in the supplies of cattle to KMC which 
tend to increase production costs, may be reduced by (a) having 
a seasonally varying producer price, (b) holding stock 011-the-
hoof until required or (c) .organising contracts with producers. 
Previous experience with the first method, (a) above, showed 
that producers tend to over-respond to a seasonal pricing structure 
if the full seasonal differeiitials are announced in advance. 
However, we recommend that further experimentation should be 
attempted, possibly by announcing- seasonal prices in two stages: 
the first at the beginning of the year, based 011 previous 
knowledge of seasonal variations of supplies; andthe second 
delayed until the current supply/demand position is more 
accurately known. A result of KMC's present and past rigid 
pricing policies is that, very little is known about how producers 
and consumers respond to marginal changes in prices. 
6.2.10. We realise that the determination of a suitable policy on the 
prices to bo paid to producers of cattle and the prices to face 
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the consumers of beef is a subject which requires much more 
study than we have been able to carry out. It is up to the 
Government to. decide what are its priorities concerning the 
. beef industry as a whole and up to the KMC to ensure that the 
latest cost data is available. Here we have put forward 
some ideas and tentative findings which we hope will stimulate 
discussion of this important subject. 
6.3. KMC's policy on transport costs of slaughter stock. 
•6.3=1. The existing policy is that KMC bears the costs of transport-
ing slaughter cattle from the producer to the factory. The 
cost to KMC of providing this service (usually by rail) in 
1967 was about £K 125,000, equivalent to about Shs. 13.00 per 
head of cattle handled. This.excludes the costs incurred by 
transporting cattle by sea to Mombasa. 
6.3.2. The effect of this policy is that some producers who are 
using more scarce resources in the form of transport facilities, 
will be subsidised at the expense of those producers who use 
less. 
6.3.3. A uniform policy may encourage an extension of output in more 
distant areas but this will be achieved at the expense of 
possibly more intensive output from more favourably situated 
areas. If it is required to encourage production of beef in 
the more isolated areas of Kenya which may be the case, then 
this may be done by means other than a uniform price system 
which is wasteful of scarce resources and penalises some 
producers for the benefit of others. Direct subsidisation 
and/or the provision of improved marketing facilities (for 
example watering points, : stock routes, and holding groujids) 
are the more economically efficient ways of encouraging 
production in selected marginal areas, not spatially uniform 
prices. 
6.3.4. Therefore we recommend that KMC should devise a scheme 
whereby producers are remunerated net of livestock transport 
costs. If producers wish to make their own transport 
arrangements, they should be permitted to do so. 
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7. The Extra-KMC Market for SlaughterStock 
7.1. Organised marketing at the' point of first sale 
7.1.1. The structure of the extra-KMC market is somewhat complex. 
On the supply side the County Council Auctions ( and to a 
less extent Vet. Dept. sales) are an important source of 
slaughter stock for local consumption. Additionally, Dalgety 
Auctioneers are authorised by KMC to organise weekly sales of 
cattle on a continuing basis. The reasoning behind this 
authorisation is that there is a local demand for a type of 
cattle (fat, barren cows) which cannot be met by KMC.itself. 
In addition the Dalgety auctions are a source of supply for 
centres of urban population which are outside KMC's control. 
7.1.2. Dalgety S. Co. are permitted to sell approximately 120 head 
per week at their sales which they hold at semi-permanent auction 
sites. These auctions have in the main been held'in the Rift 
Valley Province but they have also been held at Konza (Machakos 
District), Nanyuki (serving Meru and Nyeri Districts) and Naro 
Moru (Nyeri District). They serve both as a collecting centre 
for local cattle and also as a convenient source of the type of 
stock required by butchers. It is an established fact that a 
major proportion of cattle purchased in Lanet, Naivasha, Gilgil 
and (to a less extent) KIganjo and North Kinangop are eventually 
slaughtered for the Nairobi district market. Thus KMC by 
continuing to authorise the Dalgety Auctions is in effect 
tacitly accepting that there is a substantial corner of the 
retail market wherein it cannot compete as a slaughtering and 
distributive medium. With this we would agree and, providing 
that public health checks are not being by-passed, the competit-
ion is to be welcomed. 
7.1.3. As with the general question of 'Illegal' entry of meat over 
and above the allowed quotas into Nairobithe matter of 
diseased meat control is of paramount importance* - We 
consider however t1 at the problem can only be effectively tackled 
at the point of slaughter. Thus any temptation to restrict 
the number of "Fat Cow" Auctions' as air (attempted) method 
of reducing the 'import' of illegal meat into Nairobi should 
be avoided. There would on the other hand, appear to be scope 
for the expansion of organised slaughter stock auction sales, 
and in this connection we recommend that the Dalgety 'quota' 
be increased to 150 head per week in the Rift Valley Province. 
This increase is not likely to divert cattle previously sold 
direct to KMC but on the contrary will help to institutionalise 
and hence control the non-KMC market by the process of selling 
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